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Abstract  
 In this paper, the author proposes a developed version of “Thetical 
and Antithetical Economics” (12)(14), a theory proposed earlier by himself. 
In doing so, he first defines the nature of “inflationary gap” and “deflationary 
gap,” respectively, followed by an in-depth analysis of “Thetical and 
Antithetical Economic Line,” by examining real-life examples in Japan, the 
United States and Germany during the first half of the 20th century. In the 
subsequent discussion of “Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line,” he 
clarifies how an “antithetical bubble” has been created. In the end, he goes 
on to give a thorough description of the true identity of “deflationary gap.” 
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What is a “deflationary gap”? 
 Is the Japanese economy truly in a state of slump? The author 
believes that the answer is “no,” because the present situation is quite 
different from any conventional forms of economic depression people have 
been familiar with. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Bank of Japan 
(BOJ) Governor Haruhiko Kuroda simply misinterpret the current situation 
as “an economic slump.” This is because booms and busts of an economy 
can only take place during a “thetical economy,” but Japan is currently in an 
“antithetical economy,” where there can be no economic booms and busts, 
and where an economy simply stagnates. 
 Both the Japanese government and BOJ, failing to perceive the fact 
that Japan is in an “antithetical economy,” erroneously decided that the 
Japanese economy is in a slump. Thus, all their attempts, including 
“Abenomics” and “unprecedented scale of monetary easing,” have not 
produced any intended effects, because they are based on the flawed logic. 
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 Then, why do their attempts fail to work? The cause is clear if we 
understand the properties of a “thetical economy” and an “antithetical 
economy.” 
 What divides a “thetical economy” and an “antithetical economy” is 
whether there is “deflationary gap” or not. Deflationary gap emerges when 
the productive potential of an economy exceeds aggregate demand. Let’s 
look at the following example to help understand this. 
 Suppose that there are a monkey, a dog and a pheasant, and that each 
of them wants to drink a cup of coffee. Then, suppose that a coffee vendor 
who only has two cups worth of coffee in stock comes along. In this case, the 
aggregate demand is three cups of coffee, but the vendor can only supply two 
cups of coffee. As a result, demand exceeds supply. And this state is 
“inflationary gap (supply > demand).” 
 Under this circumstance, it would be natural for the coffee vendor to 
try hard to make more coffee, to boost his or her sales. The vendor’s effort to 
enhance his or her sales is a virtue, as was indicated by Max Weber. And if 
the coffee vendor produces another cup of coffee, supply  and demand are 
balanced and reach equilibrium. This state is called a “thetical economy.” In 
other words, in a “thetical economy,” there is no deflationary gap; instead it 
is prone to create an inflationary gap. That is to say, in a “thetical economy,” 
the coffee vendor tends to work hard to reach equilibrium, trying to adapt 
him or herself to this inflationary gap-prone state. It is obvious that French 
economist Jean-Baptiste Say’s law, or “aggregate production necessarily 
creates an equal quantity of aggregate demand,” is valid in this state. 
 However, what if the monkey, dog and pheasant each starts drinking 
five to even ten cups of coffee a day? The coffee vendor, who could easily 
produce another cup of coffee, might be unable to meet a sudden rise in the 
number of orders, or demand, and might end up raising the price of coffee. 
 Such a state is called a bubble. Tulip mania in the Netherlands during 
the 17th century is considered the first recorded speculative bubble. Many 
consumers tried to get bulbs of this exotic plant, which boosted the prices of 
bulbs to extremely high levels. The price of a single bulb was said to equal 
25 years’ income of a general worker at that time. 
 The author calls this a “thetical bubble,” or a bubble in “thetical 
economy,” which is to be created as a result of insufficient supply. In other 
words, this is a state where aggregate demand sharply exceeds supply. 
 The author then examines a different circumstance: What would 
happen if a coffee vendor with 20 cups of coffee in stock comes along, when 
the aggregate demand for coffee remains the same, or three cups, one each 
for a monkey, a dog and a pheasant. In this case, supply exceeds well beyond 
the aggregate demand for coffee. And this state is called “deflationary gap.” 
That is to say, it is a state where supply is well above demand. 
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 Because their demand for coffee has been met, it is not possible for 
the vendor to sell more cups of coffee. Thus, when demand is fully satisfied, 
a coffee vendor becomes unwilling to produce more coffee, although he or 
she has the capacity to do so. The vendor in such a circumstance might 
naturally be unwilling to make fresh capital investments, such as purchasing 
a mill to grind more coffee beans. By the same token, a coffee farm, 
providing the vendor with coffee, would be unwilling to extend its farm 
areas to produce and supply more coffee beans when there is little chance for 
more sales. 
 All that the coffee vendor and the coffee farm could do is to decrease 
the amount of coffee supply to a level just enough to satisfy the demand of 
the three coffee drinkers. And under this circumstance, suppliers would not 
dare to increase their coffee production. Instead, they would refrain from 
making fresh capital investments, even if they have surplus cash. This is a 
state where a law that “aggregate demand creates an equal quantity of 
aggregate production” is valid, which is the opposite of Say’s law that 
“aggregate production creates an equal quantity of aggregate demand.” 
 Coffee was used as an example to help simplify the analysis, but if 
coffee is replaced by goods and services, and if the three animals are 
replaced by consumers, it is clear that the example of coffee in fact denotes 
the current economic circumstance in Japan. 
 And the above-mentioned example of coffee is exactly what Japan 
faces today: Because the aggregate demand is only three cups of coffee, 
despite its capacity to serve 20 cups of coffee, manufacturers are unwilling to 
produce more coffee, and refrain from making fresh capital investment. 
 
What is “Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line”? 
 The above-mentioned economic change can be depicted by a single 
line, called “Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line” (proposed by Eizo 
Kinoshita) in this paper, as is shown in Chart 4. But before explaining 
“Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line” in Chart 4, let’s look at Chart 1, a 
basic graph utilized in economics textbook by Paul Samuelson. 
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Chart 1. Basic graph in economics textbook by Paul Samuelson. 
 
 The intersection of supply function and demand function denotes 
equilibrium. That is to say, a state where three cups of coffee were requested 
and supplied. As this chart shows, the gap between supply and demand 
conforms at equilibrium, and there are no deflationary and inflationary gaps. 
 But the equilibrium point changes greatly when a bubble emerges. In 
a bubble, firms start making more investments and consumers tend to spend 
more, which ends up pushing the equilibrium to upper right. The gap 
between the original point of the equilibrium before the emergence of a 
bubble, and the one reached with the bubble denotes “inflationary gap,” as is 
shown in Chart 2. 
 Chart 2 demonstrates that “marginal propensity to consume,” which 
is denoted by demand function “a,” gets higher when a bubble emerges, 
bringing the line to move upward at a steeper angle. 
 
Chart 2. Inflationary gap in bubble economy. 
European Scientific Journal November 2016 edition vol.12, No.31  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
5 
 The notion of this “marginal propensity to consume” can be easily 
understood through an annual income example. Suppose a person’s annual 
income increases by 1 million yen. Then, how much of it would he or she 
consume? And “marginal propensity to consume” signifies the ratio of 
consumption. 
 For example, if he or she prefers to spend 800,000 yen out of 1 
million yen in his or her annual income increase, and save the rest, or 
200,000 yen, “marginal propensity to consume” turns out to be 0.8. The 
money he or she spent, or 800,000 yen in this case, would flow into firms, 
and the deposited money of 200,000 yen would be financed to firms through 
his or her bank. Firms, by getting loans, might increase capital investment, or 
use the loans to pay salaries to their employees. As long as such a circulatory 
flow of money continues in this manner, there would never be deflationary 
gap. 
 With the emergence of a bubble, “marginal propensity to consume” 
gets higher. This is because people start to think “we should spend more, and 
buy more tulip bulbs, more stocks now because their prices might go up.” 
The value of “marginal propensity to consume” could exceed 1, as 
speculative craze gets more and more overheated and people become more 
willing to engage in speculative investments even by taking loans. 
 However, a bubble inevitably bursts. Then, firms refrain from 
making investments, and consumers stop spending, which brings the value of 
“marginal propensity to consume” to go down. Housing prices might plunge, 
for example, from 30 million yen to 10 million yen, or almost one-third of 
their original prices. 
 And the owners of those houses, who are debt-ridden, might end up 
selling their houses, which is still not enough to pay all their debts. Suppose 
such an owner still has 10 million yen in debts, for example. That person 
should certainly refrain from spending and try to pay back the debts, even 
when his or her salary gets slightly higher. 
 Such aftereffects of the burst of a bubble generally bring the slope of 
demand function to a milder angle, leading equilibrium to move largely 
down to the left. The gap between the original equilibrium and the one 
reached after the burst of a bubble denotes “deflationary gap” (Chart 3). 
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Chart 3. Deflationary gap after burst of bubble. 
 
 By the same token, it is possible to identify inflationary gap as well 
as deflationary gap in Chart 1, or Samuelson’s chart. But doing so is slightly 
complicated. 
 Thus, the author picks out inflationary gap and deflationary gap, or 
gaps between demand and supply, from Samuelson’s chart, and demonstrates 
the result in Chart 4. The line shown in Chart 4 is what the author calls 
“Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line.” In Chart 4, it is obvious that a 
single line depicts the transition of the Japanese economy during the first 
half of the 20th century, which covers from the emergence of a bubble and 
its burst during the Taisho period (1912-1926), through to Japan’s economic 
recovery after World War II. 
 
Chart 4. “Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line” in Japan during the first half of 20th 
century. 
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 In this “Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line” chart, the vertical 
axis denotes a gap between supply and demand, and the horizontal axis 
represents the flow of time. The center at the vertical axis is equilibrium. It is 
visible from Chart 4 that there emerges an inflationary gap when “Economic 
Line” comes above the equilibrium, and that there is a deflationary gap when 
the line is below the equilibrium.  
 In other words, in this chart, the economy is in a thetical economic 
phase if “Economic Line” is above the equilibrium, while it is in an 
antithetical economic phase when the line is below the equilibrium. Here, it 
is significant to note that “Economic Line” only demonstrates whether there 
is inflationary and deflationary gap or not, and that ups and downs of the line 
do not reflect the booms and busts of an economy. “Economic Line” always 
exists, regardless or time and place. That is to say, it exists in the United 
States, or in Japan, Sudan or Papua New Guinea. It also existed whether it 
was during the Edo era (1603-1868) or the Muromachi era (1336-1573), as it 
exists today, because the line simply denotes a gap between demand and 
supply. 
 
“Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line” in Japan during the first half 
of the 20th century 
 The Japanese economy was in “thetical phase” at the beginning of the 
20th century. Even though the economy followed a normal boom-bust cycle, 
and was not free from inflationary gap, supply and demand was basically 
kept in balance during this period. In other words, it was a state where the 
theory by Adam Smith was applicable. 
 World War I broke out in 1914. Because the battles were fought 
away from Japan, and mostly in Europe, the Japanese economy boomed, 
supported by the development of export industries, namely heavy industries. 
The war boom, which coincided with Taisho era in Japan, created an 
economic bubble called the “Taisho Bubble.” As is shown in Chart 4, 
“Economic Line” which remains flat in a “thetical economy,” makes a steep 
rise towards the peak of the bubble. The steep rise of “Economic Line” 
signifies the emergence of an inflationary gap. 
 But the bubble did not last long. The Japanese economy depressed 
with the end of the war and the collapse of the bubble. The depressive state 
got even worse in the aftermath of the Great Depression, which was 
triggered by the U.S. stock market crash. Because the depressive period 
coincided with the Showa era (1926-1989) in Japan, it is called the “Showa 
Depression.”  
 Demand plunged with the burst of the Taisho Bubble, which gave 
rise to a deflationary gap. Chart 4 shows that “Economic Line” goes down, 
which denotes that the Japanese economy went into an “antithetical 
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economy.” During this period, Korekiyo Takahashi, then Minister of 
Finance, came out with extensive pump-priming measures, and issued deficit 
bonds to boost war industries, even before the U.S. Government enacted 
New Deal policies. Takahashi, while working out the government policies to 
create demand, spent extravagantly as a consumer, saying “spending is a 
virtue.” In other words, he tried to help the Japanese economy get out of an 
antithetical economic phase, by taking the lead in the efforts to spend more, 
although he must have been unaware of the “Paradox of Savings.” 
 However, he soon detected a sign of inflation, and tried to cut back 
on military spending. But his action provoked violent opposition by young 
Japanese military officers, who assassinated Takahashi in February 1936. 
With the assassination of Takahashi, the deflationary gap was kept unsolved, 
which eventually led Japan to go into another war. 
 Most parts of Japan, except for Kyoto, Nara and Hokkaido, were 
bombed during World War II, and almost all of its sources of supply were 
destroyed. The nation’s supply, which always surpassed demand, plunged to 
a near zero level after the war. That is to say, “supply > demand” state 
changed into “supply < demand” state. 
 This state is visible at the point where “Economic Line” shot up 
vertically in Chart 4. It is obvious that an inflationary gap swiftly came into 
being, even skipping the process of deflationary gap dissolution. In other 
words, because its supply sources were diminished to a near zero level 
through the air strikes during the war, the deflationary gap, which had been 
in the Japanese economy since before the war, was quickly dissolved, which 
helped Japan to get out of an “antithetical economy.” 
 But Japan was hit by inflation almost at the same time, because there 
was virtually no means of production despite demand. Thus, Japanese people 
were obliged to build temporary shelters on the devastated lands, then they 
went on to construct roads and factories, and in this manner, they eventually 
reconstructed the economy. By 1955, Japan recovered its supply capacity 
well enough to be able to dissolve the inflationary gap, supported by the 
Korean war boom. The government’s 1956 annual economic report also 
announced, “the post-war period was over,” which became one of the most 
fashionable phrases used among people at that time. Indeed, the inflationary 
gap was dissolved and Japan shifted into a “thetical economy.” Shortly after, 
the rapid economic growth period began. 
  
 “Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line” in the United States during 
the first half of the 20th century 
 Now the author examines “Economic Line” of the United States 
during the first half of the 20th century (Chart 5). 
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Chart 5. “Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line” in the United States during the first half 
of 20th century. 
 
 Because all the battles were fought away from the United States 
during World War I, it won victory without suffering any war damages. 
Thus, with the end of the war in 1918, the country became a major exporter 
of materials, and its economy boomed. Much capital flew into the country, 
and soon it started prospering as a global economic center, replacing the war-
devastated Europe. As U.S. living standards went up, the demand for 
industrial products such as radios and cars also increased, which further 
boosted the economy. 
 During the 1920s, the Dow Jones average jumped from 65 dollars to 
380 dollars, and a bubble emerged, denoted by the point at which “Economic 
Line” shot up steeply in Chart 5. However, all bubbles inevitably burst. In 
October 1929, stock prices crashed in New York, which is known today as 
Black Thursday. 
 Compared with the level immediately before the crash, New York 
stock prices plunged by over 80 percent, whose after effects diminished more 
than two-thirds of the national industrial production. Nearly 12 million 
people lost their jobs, with its unemployment rate exceeding 25 percent. 
 The great depression prompted by the Black Thursday market crash 
engulfed not only the United States, but also Europe and Japan, thrusting 
those industrialized countries into a panic. U.S. President Herbert Hoover, a 
Republican, decided to keep Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, a banker, 
and attempted to stabilize the economy by pursuing his pet theory, or 
restoring finance and reducing tax. 
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 In 1930, he enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which was 
criticized as the “worst tariff bill in U.S. history.” With the legislation, tariffs 
on imported goods were raised to over 50 percent in the next four years. But 
its trade partners like Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain 
also raised their tariffs on imports from the United States in retaliation. 
 As a result, U.S. exports declined sharply, which worsened the 
depression, bringing the global economy into a critical condition. In short, 
the U.S. economy, which was in a thetical phase, eventually brought about a 
bubble, and its bursting led it into a state of depression, which induced the 
global depression. Thus, the economy moved into an antithetical phase. 
 In 1933, Hoover left Washington and Franklin Roosevelt, a 
Democrat, became President. He started extensive public projects called the 
“New Deal,” which accompanied a drastic increase in public spending on 
social capital, such as the construction of dams and roads. 
 Theories proposed by John Maynard Keynes were much embraced 
during this period, because the “Paradox of Savings,” a theory he 
established, was valid because the economy was in an antithetical phase: 
Consumers refrained from spending, and tried to save more; Firms preferred 
to repay debts, instead of maximizing profits, and refrained from making 
fresh capital investment. 
 Thus, in pursuing the New Deal policies, the U.S. government took 
the initiative, instead of submitting to “an invisible hand,” and intervened in 
the market, while trying to make up for a shortfall in demand in firms and 
consumers, just as Keynes advocated.  
 The U.S. government’s extensive fiscal actions helped ease the  
depression by 1936. However, in 1937, the government made a policy shift  
and placed higher priority on financial reconstruction, by reducing its 
expenditure on a dramatic scale. However, because the U.S. economy was 
yet to return to a “thetical economy,” it fell again into a depressive state, 
called the “Roosevelt Depression.”  
 As the U.S. example shows, financial reconstruction in the middle of 
an “antithetical economy” could deteriorate an economy even worse, 
hindering greatly the process of getting out of an “antithetical economic 
phase.” 
  
How the United States got out of an “antithetical economy”? 
 Then, how did the United States dissolve the deflationary gap and get 
out of its “antithetical economy”? Many insist that “New Deal policies were 
successful in getting out of it.” 
 That is not true. The United States got out of its “antithetical 
economy” because of World War II. Although it does not mean that Keynes’ 
theory was wrong, but a true cause which helped the United States get out of 
European Scientific Journal November 2016 edition vol.12, No.31  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
11 
its “antithetical economy” during the first half of the 20th century was the 
war, and not the Keynesian policy of the New Deal. 
 With the start of the war with Japan, the United States increased the 
government expenditure by issuing war bonds on a dramatic scale. The U.S. 
unemployment rate fell to 1.2 percent in 1944, and the booming war 
industries helped dissolve the deflationary gap. 
 There is also another important factor which enabled the United 
States to resolve the deflationary gap. It is obvious if we think where the 
battles were fought during the war. They were mostly fought in Europe, on 
islands in the Pacific, as well as in China, but not on the American continent. 
Hawaii, which suffered a surprise attack by Japan, was the only exception.  
 This means that the supply capacity of the United States was kept 
intact during the war, in total contrast to Japan. Many parts of the Japanese 
mainland were attacked, and the country lost most of the sources for supply. 
In Japan, the war helped eliminate the deflationary gap, but the destruction of 
its supply sources brought about an inflationary gap at the same time. On the 
other hand, the United States, away from the battlefields during the war, with 
its supply sources preserved intact, enjoyed the war boom which was 
instrumental in creating more demand than supply, which quickly helped its 
economy proceed into a thetical phase. 
 
Chart 6. “Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line” in Germany during the first half of 20th 
century 
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German defeat in the war eliminated inflationary gap 
 Next, the author examines “Thetical and Antithetical Economic Line” 
of Germany, another participant of the two wars, as shown in Chart 6. Unlike 
Japan and the United States, whose economies boomed through World War 
I, Germany (then Weimar Republic) suffered the war devastation, and was 
defeated in the war. Hyperinflation hit the nation right after World War I. It 
is true that Japan was also hit by hyperinflation after World War II, but the 
inflation Germany experienced right after World War I was even worse. In 
fact, it was so violent that the price of a loaf of bread rose to 1 trillion marks. 
 Germany was then hit by the subsequent Great Depression, 
originated in the United States, which engulfed the entire European 
continent. Amid the growing social unrest, Nazi Germany came into power, 
by promising work and bread for all the people. 
 Adolf Hitler did exactly what Japan’s Finance Minister Korekiyo 
Takahashi had done, but Hitler did it on a larger scale. For instance, the Nazi 
government constructed autobahns, a highway network across the nation, a 
public project of an unprecedented scale. 
 But it should be noted that Germany at that time was not in an 
“antithetical economy.” The German hyperinflation right after World War I 
was in essence an “inflationary gap.” And there had never been a 
deflationary gap in Germany, unlike the United States and Japan, as is shown 
in Chart 6. 
 There was no bubble in Germany before the Great Depression, and 
the economy was in a thetical phase. Thus, during the Great Depression, 
although its economy suffered a slump which is commonly observed during 
a thetical economic phase, it was free from deflationary gap. 
 In other words, the extensive public projects like the construction of 
the autobahns, helped the country return to the growth track of a “thetical 
economy” after World War I. Although some insist that “economic policies 
by Hitler created the boom,” but as “Economic Line” in Chart 6 
demonstrates, all Hitler did was to restore the war-damaged supply sources 
through public projects, as part of the country’s post-war reconstruction 
efforts.  
 Germany again became a battleground during World War II, which 
destroyed its supply sources. But unlike Japan, it took much more time for 
Germany to restore the economy. This was because the division of the 
country impeded the restoration of its supply sources, and also because no 
war-related demand, like the Korean war for Japan, was created. Thus, it 
took a longer time, than Japan, for the country to eliminate the inflationary 
gap. 
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Why unprecedented an “antithetical bubble” emerged? 
 Since the author believes that the analysis of the examples of Japan, 
the United States and Germany, helped clarify the essence of “Thetical and 
Antithetical Economic Line,” it is important to return to the examination of 
the Japanese economy once again, by using this line. 
 After World War II, Japan’s policy objective completely changed, 
and making itself an economic power, instead of a military power, became 
its primary national goal. The Cold War confrontation of the western and the 
eastern bloc nations, led by the United States and the Soviet Union, 
respectively, worked favorably for the Japanese economy.  
 There were also some “windfall” incidents, which profited its 
economy: Japan was not divided, despite its defeat in the war, and this was 
fortunate for its economy. This was because the division might have caused 
serious damage to its economic development, which was obvious from the 
German and Korean cases. 
 Japan was placed under the administration of the United States, and 
made a fresh start to become “a global factory,” under the guidance of 
General Headquarters. Japan could allocate much of its resources to increase 
productivity, because Article 9 of the constitution stipulates that Japan 
should limit its military cost to around one percent of its gross domestic 
products (world average is around two percent). 
 The outbreak of the Korean and Vietnam wars, created through the 
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, pushed the Japanese 
economy to grow further, because they boosted war-related demand. 
Although Japan suffered slight damage from the two oil crisis during the 
1970s, it continued to grow to be the second largest economy in the world. 
 But as the economy continued a rapid growth, a wrong belief that 
“stock and land prices would go up forever” was reinforced among Japanese 
people, which inspired more and more people to invest in real estate in the 
central parts of Tokyo. At the peak of the bubble, it was claimed that “the 
total land price of the 23 wards in Tokyo is equivalent to that of the whole 
land space of the United States.” The Nikkei Stock Average hit a historic 
high of 38,915 yen on December 29, 1989, the final session of the year. 
 However, a bubble inevitably bursts. And shortly, Japanese stock 
prices started to plunge, along with land prices, which left a serious 
aftermath in the form of huge amount of bad loans. 
 The course of the above-mentioned events is depicted by “Thetical 
and Antithetical Economic Line” in Chart 7. 
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Chart 7. “Antithetical Bubble” today’s Japan fell in. 
 
 After the burst of the bubble, the Japanese economy fell into an 
antithetical phase. The subsequent long depression was called the “lost 
decade.” But another decade passed after that, which was then called the 
“two lost decades,” and the depressive state continues up to the present. 
 What is more, the deflationary gap in the Japanese economy is 
growing today due to the repeated easing measures by BOJ, which is fueling 
a money glut to reach a level as to create “an antithetical bubble,” the first of 
its kind in human history. 
 If easing measures on “an unprecedented scale” are to be carried out 
when there is a deflationary gap, surplus money should naturally flow into 
stock markets. 
 That is to say, a rise in stock prices, as a result of such easing 
measures by a central bank, is a “fake,” or a result of artificial creation.  This 
is because the money that flows into stock markets is essentially the same as 
the “money tucked away in banks,” which is a true identity of the 
deflationary gap today. 
European Scientific Journal November 2016 edition vol.12, No.31  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
15 
 
Behavioral principle of firms and consumers in an “antithetical 
economy” 
 Firms in a “thetical economy” seek to obtain bank loans for capital 
investment in order to increase profits, while consumers in this economic 
phase tend to spend more on goods and services, while they continue to save.  
 Banks furnish firms with funds they obtained from consumers in the 
form of deposits, then firms invest the money they get from banks in the 
form of loans, on capital assets to gain profits, which are to be paid to 
consumers in the form of salaries. Consumers then save part of their salaries, 
and purchase new goods and services. Money in this phase continuously 
flows through firms, consumers and banks, as shown in Chart 8. 
 
Chart 8. Circulatory flow of meney in “Thetical Economy.” 
 
 In an “antithetical economy,” however, money stops flowing and is 
tucked away. 
 Economic statistics during the first half of 2016 show that Japanese 
companies refrain from making fresh investments, although some firms have 
enjoyed the highest-ever profits, benefited by the deflated value of yen. 
Then, why are they unwilling to make capital investments at home? The 
answer is quite simple: This is because “making domestic capital 
investments is unlikely to bring any profits” in Japan. Any company 
manager should consider investment efficiency, and decide not to do so if 
there is little prospect for profits.  
  That is to say, if a company is convinced that it can “gain 1.2 million 
yen by investing 1 million yen,” for instance, the value of investment 
efficiency for the firm is larger than 1. Under such a circumstance, then, its 
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manager would be very willing to make an investment even by getting into 
debt. 
 Thus in a “thetical economy,” because the value of investment 
efficiency surpasses 1, firms prefer to take bank loans to make fresh 
investments. 
 But when only 800,000 yen can be collected in return for 1 million 
yen in an investment, which means that the value of investment efficiency is 
less than 1, company managers should be discouraged to make any fresh 
investment. And this is exactly the case with Japan at the moment. Thus, 
company managers are unwilling to make fresh investments now, which is  
reflected in the slow growth of machinery orders in Japan. 
 Company managers are unwilling to make investments as long as the 
value of investment efficiency is less than 1, regardless of how hard Prime 
Minister Abe tries to encourage them to do so. 
  
True identity of a “deflationary gap” 
 Then, a question naturally arises: What do firms do in an “antithetical 
economy”? 
 In the study of physics, it is said that “antimatter owns opposite 
properties of normal matter.” The principle is applicable also to a “thetical” 
and an “antithetical economy.” 
 “Thetical Economy” is a phase where the economics theory by Adam 
Smith is valid. 
 Adam Smith economics insists that firms as well as consumers 
pursue only their personal gains. Firms seek the maximization of profits, 
while consumers seek the maximization of efficiency. Thus, the 
maximization of profits and efficiency constitutes a principle which governs 
their behaviors in a “thetical economy.” 
 Whereas in an “antithetical economy,” they behave in an opposite 
way. Companies tend to seek “the minimization of debts,” and consumers 
would seek “the minimization of expenditure.” 
 Then the circulatory flow of money, flowing continuously through 
firms, consumers and banks, as shown in Chart 8, should also stop in an 
“antithetical economy,” where consumers seek to minimize expenditure and 
firms seek to minimize debts, as shown in Chart 9. 
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Chart 9. Why deflationary gap emerges? 
 
 Companies prefer to repay debts, even when they gain profits, 
because the value of investment efficiency is less than 1, thinking that it is 
more efficient to pay back debts and reduce interest payment, rather than 
making fresh investments which is clearly unprofitable. 
 Consumers prefer to save more money out of their salaries, instead of 
buying more goods. 
 As a result, the amount of money in the form of paid-back debts from 
firms, as well as the deposits by consumers, gets tucked away in banks. 
 The original function of banks is to gain profits by furnishing firms 
with funds, after the banks get them in the form of deposits from consumers. 
But since firms stop borrowing money from banks, a large amount of funds 
ends up being stored in banks. And the money tucked away in banks is the 
true identity of a deflationary gap. 
 Japan’s Cabinet Office defines a deflationary gap as “the gap 
between aggregate supply and effective demand,” which is wrong. The true 
identity of a deflationary gap is the uncirculated money being tucked away in 
banks. 
 Finally, Chart 10 shows how companies tend to shun “capital 
investment (borrowing)” and head towards “debt repayment (saving),” when 
an economy moves from a thetical phase into an antithetical phase. It is 
obvious from the chart that non-financial firms stopped taking in loans and 
started paying more debts after 1995. In other words, the more companies 
tend to pay back debts and refrain from getting loans for fresh capital 
investments, the more money is being tucked away in banks. The chart also 
shows that companies are becoming more and more willing to accumulate 
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net financial assets after 1998, as is denoted by an upward sloping curve in 
the chart, and such corporate behavior remains unchanged even today in 
Japan where Abenomics policies are being implemented. 
 
Chart 10. Financial net worth of non-financial enterprises (total) in Japan from 1980 to 
2015. The data from the Bank of Japn. 
 
References:  
1. Samuelson, P. (1977) Economics (Japanese edition translated by 
Shigeto Tsuru). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 
2. Kinoshita, E. (2004) Keizai wo Shihai suru 2tsu no Hosoku―-Kami 
no Miezaru Te to Gosei no Gobiyu no Sekai (two principles control 
the economy---invisible hands of God and fallacy of composition). 
Tokyo: Denki Shoin 
3. Kinoshita, E. (2009) Keizai-gaku ha naze machigae tsudukerunoka---
Marukusu mo Keinzu mo minogashita 2tsu no hosoku (why 
economics keep on making mistakes--two principles overlooked by 
Marx and Kaynes). Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten 
4. Kinoshita, E. (2012) Sekai ga ima ochiitteiru keizaigaku-no wana 
(trap of economics the world has fallen in). Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten 
5. Kinoshita, E. (2012) Amerika no tsugino hakennkoku ha dokoka?: 
Konmeisuru sekai keizai no saki-o yomu! (which country would be a 
hegemon after the United States? : clarifying the future of flagging 
global economy!). Tokyo: Saiz_sha (ISBN 978-4883928323) 
6. Kinoshita, E. (2013) Sekai Keizai no haken wo nigirunoha nihon de-
a-ru (Japan to be the next hegemon of the world)). Tokyo: Fusosha 
7. Kinoshita, E. (2013) Shinobiyoru sekai kyoko (depression is creeping 
up on the world). Tokyo: Fusosha 
8. Kinoshita, E. and Mizuno, T. (2016) Tokei-gaku de wakaru biggu 
deta (big data obtained through statistics). Tokyo: JUSE Press, Ltd. 
European Scientific Journal November 2016 edition vol.12, No.31  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
19 
9. Kinoshita, E. (2011) ‘A Proposal of Primal and Dual Problems in 
Macro Economics,’ Journal of China-USA Business Review, Vol. 10, 
No. 2, pp.115-124. United States: David Publishing Company 
10. Kinoshita, E. (2011) ‘Why Bubble Economy Occurs and Crashes,’ 
Journal of China-USA Business Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp.111-120. 
United States: David Publishing Company 
11. Kinoshita, E. (2011) ‘Globalization or Isolation? Recardo’s Mode,’ 
Journal of China-USA Business Review, Vol. 10, No. 10, pp.1-9. 
United States: David Publishing Company 
12. Kinoshita, E. (2012) ‘A Proposal of Thetical Economy and 
Antithetical Economy--Mechanism of Occurrence and Collapse of 
Bubble Economy,’ Journal of Business and Economics, Vol. 3, No. 
2, pp.117-130. United States: Academic Star Publishing 
13. Kinoshita, E. (2015) ‘Thetical and Antithetical Business 
Management,’ Journal of Business and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 6, 
pp.1086-1096. United States: Academic Star Publishing 
14. Kinoshita, E. (2015) ‘A Proposal of Thetical Economy and 
Antithetical Economy by Using Operations Research Techniques,’ 
European Scientific Journal, July 2015 edition, Vol. 11, No. 19, 
pp.29-48. 
 
  
